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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN INDIANA LAW
SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICTS IN A CITY-COUNTY
CONSOLIDATION: CONFLICT BETWEEN METROPOLITAN
REFORM AND "ONE MAN-ONE VOTE" IN INDIANAPOLIS-
MARION COUNTY
In 1969 the Indiana General Assembly enacted the Consolidated
First Class Cities and Counties Act,' commonly referred to as the
UNI-GOV act. This statute provides that in any county in Indiana "in
which there is one (1) but not more than one city of the first class and no
city of the second class"2 a consolidated city' shall be formed as a
separate municipal body corporate, merging the first class city into the
consolidated city.4 Since only Marion County satisfied these require-
ments, application of the UNI-GOV Act was limited to it.5 On January
1, 1970 Indianapolis and Marion County became one consolidated city.6
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS RAISED By "SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICTS"
UNDER UNI-GOV
The UNI-GOV Act represents an attempt to create a political unit
1. IND. CoDE §§ 18-4-1-1 to 18-4-5-4 (1971), Im. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-9101 to
48-9507 (Supp. 1970).
2. IND. CODE § 18-4-1-2(b) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9102(b) (Supp. 1970).
3. "Consolidated City" shall be a body corporate, created by this act, and
including within its boundaries all of the territory of a first class city and'
of the county, except for the territory located in excluded cities; Provided,
however, That certain departments and special taxing districts of the con-
solidated city may have jurisdiction as provided in this act in territory
greater or less than such territorial boundaries. The consolidated city shall be
a city and shall be a city of the first class within the meaning of all laws of
the state.
IND. CODE § 18-4-1-2(f) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9102(f) (Supp. 1970).
4. IND. CODE § 18-4-1-3 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9103 (Supp. 1970).
5. In Dortch v. Lugar, -Ind.-, 266 N.E.2d 25 (1971), the Indiana Supreme Court
held that the UNI-GOV Act did not violate the provisions of the Indiana Constitu-
tion prohibiting special laws. The court stated:
The fact that the Act was drafted with Indianapolis and Marion County
in the minds of the legislators, a fact of which we take judicial cognizance,
does not, of itself, put it without the constitutional provisions of Art. 4,
§§ 22 and 23, there being sufficient legislative reason to distinguish on the
basis of population, and there being provision made for the application of
the Act to all counties that should so qualify.
Id. at -, 266 N.E.2d at 32.
6. IND. CODE § 18-4-15-2 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9101 n. (Supp. 1970).
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capable of utilizing the resources of an entire metropolitan area for
common planning and solution of area-wide problems.7 It is only the
third such attempt in this country.' Unlike its predecessors, however,
the UNI-GOV Act raises serious constitutional issues insofar as it
fails to consolidate all of the governmental functions of the city and
county. Exemplary of this failing is the Act's exclusion from the con-
solidated city of "any city other than a first class city in the county and
any town in the county having a population in excess of 5,000 inhabitants
according to the last preceding United States decennial census,"9 and its
failure to consolidate the existing city and county school districts," law
7. See Richardson, Decentralization of Metropolitan Government: Reform in
Indianapolis, 4 J.L. RmEonam 311 (1970).
8. The first major city-county consolidation occurred in 1963 when the govern-
ments of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee were merged. Services such
as health, welfare, police, assessment, hospital, parks and recreation are provided by
the metropolitan government to the entire county and are supported by the taxes paid
by all the residents of the county. Additional services such as street cleaning and
lighting, refuse collection and fire protection are provided in the urban services district,
which encompasses the area of pre-consolidation Nashville. The residents of the urban
services district pay an additional tax to support the additional services they receive.
In Frazer v. Carr, 210 Tenn. 565, 360 S.W.2d 449 (1962), the Tennessee Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the dual taxation provisions of the consolidation.
See generally D. BOOTH, METRoPoLITIcS: THE NASHVILLE CONSOLIDATION (1963);
H. DUNComBE, COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 195-213 (1966); B. HAWKINS,
NASHVILLE METRO: THE POLITICS OF CITY COUNTY CONSOLIDATION (1966) ; R. MARTIN,
METROPOLIS IN TRANSITION (1963) ; Lineberry, Reforming Metropolitan Governance:
Requiem or Reality, 58 GEo. L.J. 675 (1970).
The second important city-county consolidation was the 1967 merger of Jacksonville
and Duval County, Florida. This consolidation followed the same pattern as the
Nashville-Davidson County consolidation and established a general service district which
encompassed the whole county as well as five separate urban service districts for
the five municipalities in the county. See generally R. MARTIN, CONSOLIDATION:
JACKSONVILLE AND DuvAL COUNTY (1968) ; Lineberry, supra.
9. IND. CODE § 18-4-1-2(d) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9102(d) (Supp. 1970).
The cities of Beech Grove and Lawrence and the town of Speedway City are excluded
from the consolidated city even though they are located entirely within Marion
County. For a discussion of the voting rights of citizens of these municipalities, see
text accompanying note 55 infra.
10. IND. CODE § 18-4-3-14 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9213 (Supp. 1970). In
United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, -F. Supp.-, 26 Ind. Dec. 527 (S.D.
Ind., Aug. 18, 1971), where the district court held that the Indianapolis School Board
had failed to desegregate its school system effectively, the failure to consolidate the
city and county school corporations came into issue. The court concluded that the
effect of the failure to consolidate the school corporations into one metropolitan school
corporation may have been to retard desegregation. The court ordered the plaintiff tojoin all the interested school corporations so that the following questions could be
litigated.
1. [Is] Chapter 173 of the Acts of 1969 [the UNI-GOV Act] . . .
unconstitutional as tending to cause segregation or to inhibit desegregation
of the Indianapolis School System?
2. If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, did the passage
of the UNI-GOV Act automatically extend the boundaries of the School
City coterminous with the boundaries of the Civil City, as provided generally
by Indiana law?
SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICTS
enforcement agencies 1 and fire departments. 2
In lieu of consolidating the police and fire departments of the city
and county, the Act provides for the creation of "special service districts,"
initially coterminous with the limits of pre-consolidation Indianapolis."
3. If both of the foregoing questions are answered in the affirmative,
are Lawrence, Beech Grove, and Speedway City presently under the juris-
diction of the defendant Board, or does UNI-GOV merely have the effect
of annexing the eight township school corporations?
4. Regardless of the answer to the first three questions, should the
General Assembly, by appropriate legislation, provide for the creation of
a metropolitan school district embracing all of Marion County, together with
all or some substantial part of the other counties going to comprise the
Indianapolis Metropolitan Statistical Area, in order to purge the State
of its role in contributing to dejure segregation in the Indianapolis School
System?
5. If the answer to Question 4 is in the affirmative, and the General
Assembly fails to act within a reasonable time, or in a reasonable way, does
this Court have the power to create such a metropolitan school district by
judicial decree?
Id. at -, 26 Ind. Dec. at 561 (footnotes omitted). The court questioned whether
there may be an analogy between the court's power in desegregation and apportion-
ment cases, since both arise under the equal protection clause. Since the court may
order redistricting for apportionment, it may be that a court could do likewise to
effect desegregation. If either the legislature or the court were to create a metro-
politan school district, it would be consistent with the over-all consolidation purpose
of the UNI-GOV Act even though it would surely meet with strong opposition from
many citizens of the consolidated city.
11. The police division of the department shall be known as the Con-
solidated City Police Force of -. The authority and jurisdiction of such
consolidated city police force shall extend throughout the territory of the
police special service district, as the same may exist from time to time,
and the sheriff and the sheriffs department of the county shall continue
to have the same authority and jurisdiction as presently exists for the
sheriff of such county until such police special service district is extended
as provided in section 1208 of this article....
IND. CODE § 18-4-12-7 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9407 (Supp. 1970).
12. The fire division of the department shall be known as the Con-
solidated City Fire Force of -. The authority and jurisdiction of such con-
solidated city fire force shall extend throughout the territory of the fire
special service district, as the same may exist from time to time, and the
township trustee of townships within the consolidated city but outside the fire
special service district, shall continue to have the same authority and jurisdic-
tion relating to fire protection as presently exists for the trustee of such
township.
IND. CoDE § 18-4-12-35 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9442 (Supp. 1970).
13. "Police Special Service District" shall mean a special service district
in which the consolidated city police force created under this article shall
have jurisdiction. At the effective date of this act such police special service
district shall be coterminous with the boundaries of the the first class city-
as the same existed on the day preceding the effective date of this act.
IND. CoDE § 18-4-12-6(b) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9406(b) (Supp. 1970).
"Fire Special Service District" shall mean a special service district in
which the consolidated city fire force created under this article shall have
jurisdiction. At the effective date of this article, such fire special service
district shall be coterminous with the boundaries of the first class city as the
same shall have existed on the day preceding the effective date of this
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The jurisdiction of the consolidated city's police and fire departments is
limited to the area of these districts.' 4 The Act further authorizes the
city-county council to expand the districts to include any additional
portion of the consolidated city.'5 The city-county council has not yet
acted to expand the districts.
The exclusive power to approve the special service district's budget,
make appropriations and levy taxes on the property within the district is
vested in a special service district council. 8 Membership on the council
is limited to those members of the city-county council representing: (1)
single electoral districts, at least half of whose population resides within
the special service district; or (2) the county at-large electoral district,
provided sixty per cent of the population of the county resides within that
special service district."
The effect of this scheme for determining membership on these
governing bodies is to permit the taxation without representation of
certain persons residing in special service districts, while affording repre-
sentation without taxation to some non-residents of those districts. This
anamoly results from the fact that a voter whose special service district
contains less than half the population of his electoral district is not
entitled to representation on the special service district council, the unit of
government authorized to tax his property. On the other hand, a voter
whose electoral district contains fifty per cent or more of the population of
a special service district has representation on that district's council even
if he lives outside its boundaries so that his property is not subject to taxa-
tion by that council. Furthermore, any resident of a special service district
is subject to disfranchisement if the population of the electoral district
in which he lives shifts so that less than half of the resultant population
act ..
IND. CODE § 18-4-12-34 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9441 (Supp. 1970).
14. See notes 11-12 ,rupra.
15. IND. CODE §§ 18-4-12-8, 18-4-12-36 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-9408,
48-9443 (Supp. 1970). The police and fire special service districts may be expanded
to include any or all of the territory outside the present limits of the district but
still within the limits of the consolidated city, provided the city-county council
determines that reasonable and adequate police or fire protection can be provided in
the expanded area and that the extension of the boundaries of the special service
district is in the public interest of the citizens of the consolidated city. The "excluded
cities and towns" (note 9 supra) may become part of the police special service
district; however, there is no provision allowing the excluded cities and towns to
become part of the fire special service district.
16. Pub. L. No. 258, § 6, [1971] Ind. Acts 996, formerly IND. CODE § 18-4-4-5
(1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9225 (Supp. 1970); IND. CODE § 18-4-5-8 (1971), IND.
ANN. STAT. § 48-9501 (Supp. 1970).
17. Pub. L. No. 258, § 1(m), [1971] Ind. Acts 991, formerly IND. CODE §
18-4-1-2(m) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9102(m) (Supp. 1970). For the text of the
superseded statute, see note 48 infra.
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resides in the special service district. 8 The obvious question is whether
such a scheme can meet the one man-one vote standard of the equal,
protection clause.
ONE MAN-ONE VOTE AND THE SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICT COUNCILS
The United States Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the
one man-one vote standard is applicable to municipal elections:
[A]s a general rule, whenever a state or local government
decides to select persons by popular elections to perform govern-
mental functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be given
an equal opportunity to participate in that election, and when
members of an elected body are chosen from separate districts,
each district must be established on a basis that will insure, as
far as practicable, that equal numbers of voters can vote for pro-
portionally equal numbers of officials."
Thus, in order to test the constitutional validity of the UNI-GOV scheme
for determining membership on special service district councils, three
questions must be answered: (1) Are the members of the special service
district councils selected by "popular election"? (2) Do the members of
the special service district councils "perform governmental functions" ?2"
18. Pub. L. No. 258, § 1(m), [19711 Ind. Acts 991, formerly IND. CODE §
18-4-1-2(m) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9102(m) (Supp. 1970).
19. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970) (emphasis added).
20. The problem of determining what constitute governmental functions for
local appointment purposes plagued the Court for about three years. Sailors v. Board
of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), introduced the confusion by classifying the functions
of a local school board as essentially administrative rather than legislative and
refusing to require reapportionment. The board had the power to appoint a county
school superintendent, prepare an annual budget, levy taxes, distribute delinquent taxes
and transfer areas from one school district to another, in addition to its function of
supervising the services of the county schools. After Sailors it was thought that the
one man-one vote principle would only be applied where the elected body performed
legislative functions.
However, in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), the first case to
apply the one man-one vote principle to the election of local officials, the Court applied
the principle despite an assertion that the functions of the defendant county com-
missioners were not sufficiently legislative. The commissioners had the power to
establish a courthouse and jail, appoint numerous minor officials, fill vacancies in
the county offices, let contracts in the name of the county, administer the county's
public welfare services, set the county tax rate, serve as a board of equalization
for the tax assessments and build roads and bridges. As the governing body- of the
county, it also had authority to build and run a hospital, an airport and libraries, as
well as fixing the boundaries of the school districts within the county. The Court based
its decision on the fact that the officials in question had the "power to make a large
number of decisions having a broad range of impacts on all of the citizens of the
county." Id. at 483.
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(3) Are the members of the special district councils elected from districts
"established on a basis that will insure, as far as practicable, that equal
numbers of voters can vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials"?
As to the first question, the one man-one vote principle has been
applied exclusively to the election, rather than the appointment, of public
officials. This fact was demonstrated in Sailors v. Board of Education,2
where the Supreme Court held that the one man-one vote doctrine was
not applicable when the method of selection was basically appointive. The
Court said:
[T]he choice of members of the county school board did not
involve an election and since none was required for these non-
legislative offices, the principle of "one man, one vote" has
no relevancy.22
In Sailors, members of local school district boards were elected by popular
vote of the citizens of the respective districts. Thereafter, each local board
sent one delegate to a meeting at which the five members of the county
board of education were selected. Since each of the local school boards
had equal unit representation despite the widely varying populations of
their representative districts, the plaintiff contended that the system of
choosing the members of the county board violated the principle of one
man-one vote. In a footnote, the Court found that this procedure did not
constitute a popular election:
It is evident, therefore, that the membership of the county
In Iadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970), the Court was again
urged to "distinguish for apportionment purposes between elections for 'legislative'
officials and 'administrative' officers." Id. at 55. Relying upon the Avery rationale,
the Court again refused to make the distinction and held that although the powers of
the trustees of the junior college district were not as broad as those of the commis-
sioners in Avery
• . . the trustees perform important governmental functions within the
districts, and we think these powers are general enough and have sufficient
impact throughout the district to justify the conclusion that the principle which
we applied in Avery should also be applied here.
Id. at 53-54. The functions of the trustees in Hadley were to "levy and collect
taxes, issue bonds with certain restrictions, hire and fire teachers, make con-
tracts, collect fees, supervise and discipline students, pass on petitions to annex school
districts, acquire property by condemnation, and in general manage the operations of
the junior college." Id. at 54.
In summary, after Sailors the Court refused to distinguish between legislative
and administrative functions and looked rather to see if the functions performed by
the governing body had substantial impact throughout the area governed by that body.
Therefore, the contention that the failure to apply the one man-one vote principle
in Sailors was based upon the administrative functions of the board of education has
been put to rest by the decisions in Avery and Hadley.
21. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
22. Id. at 111.
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board is not determined, directly or indirectly, through an
election in which the citizens of the county participate. The
"electorate" under the Michigan system is composed not of the
people of the county, but the delegates from the local school
boards.2"
In Hadley v. Junior College District,24 the Supreme Court was
confronted with a statutory apportionment formula for the popular
election of junior college trustees. In explaining its application of the one
man-one vote principle, the Court emphasized the presence of a popular
election:
[A] constant factor is the decision of the government to have
citizens participate individually by ballot in the selection of certain
people who carry out governmental functions. Thus in the case
now before us, while the office of junior college trustee differs
in certain respects from those offices considered in prior cases,
it is exactly the same in one crucial factor-these officials are
elected by popular vote.2
In Sailors the one man-one vote principle was irrelevant because
membership on the county board was not determined by an election in
which the citizens of the county participated. In Hadley, where the
officials were chosen through popular election, the Supreme Court applied
the one man-one vote principle and invalidated the apportionment formula.
From these two rulings it follows that whenever officials are determined,
either directly or indirectly, through an election in which all of the
citizens of the governed area have a right to participate, there is a popular
election, and the one man-one vote principle applies. Any statutory provi-
sion, therefore, which obstructs the one man-one vote principle should be
invalidated as violative of equal protection.
Under the UNI-GOV Act, determination of membership on special
service district councils is basically elective rather than appointive in
nature. The Act specifically directs that certain members of the popularly
elected city-county council shall also be members of the various special
service district councils. The city-county council, therefore, has no
independent authority to appoint members to these various councils.
Under the criteria set forth in both Sailors and Hadley, membership on
23. Id. at 109-10 n. 6.
24. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
25. Id. at 54.
26. Pub. L. No. 258, § 1(m), [1971] Ind. Acts 991, formerly IxD. CoDE §
18-4-1-2(m) (1971), IND. Axsx. STAT. § 48-9102(m) (Supp. 1970).
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the special service district councils is determined by popular election.
The requirement that popularly elected officials perform "govern-
mental functions" before one man-one vote applies has posed a continuing
problem for the Supreme Court. 7 In light of the cases, however, the test
for determining whether the elected body performs governmental func-
tions appears to be: Do the decisions of the elected body have sufficient
impact on all the citizens throughout the district governed by that body ?28
Under the amended29 UNI-GOV Act, the special service district
council has exclusive power to adopt the budget, levy taxes and make
appropriations." The powers of the special service district council are
not as broad as either those of the county commissioners in Avery v.
Midland County"' or of the junior college trustees in Hadley." However,
the council's powers are general and have substantial impact throughout
the special service district. In Hadley, the Court stated:
Education has traditionally been a vital governmental
function and these trustees, whose election the State has opened
to all qualified voters, are governmental officials in every
relevant sense of that term.3
Taxation is clearly as traditional a vital governmental function as
education. Therefore, since the special service district councilmen have
the power of taxation, they must also be considered governmental
officials. The decisions made by the special service district council con-
cerning budget and appropriations also have a great impact, since these
decisions determine the priority and quality of services performed for the
benefit of the district's residents.
Having established that the members of the special service district
councils are selected, in the words of Hadley, "by popular elections to
perform governmental functions," ' it now becomes necessary to examine
the districts themselves in order to determine whether the districts are
"established on a basis that will insure, as far as practicable, that equal
numbers of voters can vote for proportionally equal numbers of
officials."22 In other words, does one special service district resident's
27. See note 20 supra.
28. Id.
29. See note 47 infra & text accompanying.
30. Pub. L. No. 258, § 6 [1971] Ind. Acts 996, formerly IND. CODE § 18-4-4-5
(1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9225 (Supp. 1970).
31. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
32. See note 20 supra.
33. 397 U.S. at 56.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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vote carry as much weight as that of any other?
In Avery, the Supeme Court held:
[T]he Constitution permits no substantial variation from
equal population in drawing districts for units of local govern-
ment having general governmental powers over the entire
geographic area served by the body.. 6
In Hadley, the Court again applied the one man-one vote principle to a
unit of local government and required substantial equality of population
within districts. However, in Abate v. Mundt," the most recent appor-
tionment case involving local government, the Court appeared to relax
the population equality standard and approved an apportionment plan
which produced a total deviation from population equality of 11.9 per
cent.88 While finding that the plan contained no indigenous bias tending
to favor particular geographic areas or political interests, the Abate
Court emphasized that its decision was also "based on the long tradition
of overlapping function and dual personnel in Rockland County govern-
ment." 9 The Court warned, however, that "nothing we say today should
be taken to imply that even these factors would justify substantially
greater deviations from population equality.""0
The UNI-GOV Act requires that single electoral districts be compact
in configuration and as equal as practicable in population.41 However,
36. 390 U.S. at 484-85.
37. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
38. The apportionment plan provided for a county legislature composed of 18
members elected from five legislative districts which corresponded exactly to the county's
five constituent towns. Each district was assigned its legislators according to its
population in relation to the smallest town or district. The smallest district was
assigned one legislator, and the number of legislators assigned to the others was
determined by dividing the population of each of the larger districts by the population
of the smallest. The fractional results were rounded to the nearest whole number. The
plan resulted in one district being over-represented by 4.8 per cent and another
under-represented by 7.1 per cent. Therefore, there was a total deviation from
population equality of 11.9 per cent.
39. 403 U.S. at 187. For more than 100 years the county had been governed
by a board of supervisors made up of the supervisors of the five constituent towns in
the county. The county board of supervisors had never been separately elected, but
rather its members held their offices solely by virtue of their election as town supervisors.
40. Id.
41. The twenty-five (25) single member council electoral districts pro-
vided in section 306 shall have the following characteristics:
(1) Be as equal as practicable in population.
(2) Be compact in configuration, subject only to natural boundary lines,
such as railroads, interstate highways, other major highways, rivers, creeks,
parks and major industrial complexes and to the requirement, where practicable,
of being located entirely outside or entirely inside a special service
district. . ..
IND. CODE § 18-4-3-8 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9208 (Supp. 1970).
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under the provisions of the amended UNI-Gov Act, it is possible to have
districts which vary 100 per cent from population equality. In order to
illustrate this point, assume that each of the single electoral districts 2
has a population of 100,000. For the election of members to the city-
county council, these districts meet the population equality standard of
Avery. However, it is doubtful that they meet the constitutional mandate
of Avery, as modified by Abate, for the election of special service district
councilmen. Membership on the special service district council is made up
of those members of the city-county council who represent electoral
districts in which half or more of the population also resides in the
special service district.4" Each such electoral district is entitled to one
representative on the special service district council. Therefore, any
single member of the special service district council could represent as few
as 50,000 or as many as 100,000 residents of the district. Although
Abate relaxed the population equality standard applicable in local appor-
tionment cases, it is doubtful whether a potential 100 per cent deviation
from population equality could be supported.
The UNI-GOV scheme also seems to violate the spirit and policy
of the apportionment decisions of the Supreme Court. In speaking of the
apportionment cases, the Hadley Court said:
The consistent theme of those decisions is that the right to vote
in an election is protected by the United States Constitution
against dilution or debasement.44
The Court's decisions reflect the general policy that each individual should
be given equal representation on the elected bodies of government which
allocate benefits and burdens among the citizenry. When the votes of
both residents and non-residents of special service districts carry equal
weight in electing the governing bodies of those districts, the resident's
votes are diluted. Non-residents of special service districts, being unaffect-
ed by the benefits and burdens allocated by the elected officials, have no
right to special service district representation.
DECISIONS UNDER THE ORIGINAL PROVISIONS OF THE UNI-GOV ACT
The constitutionality of certain provisions of the UNI-GOV Act
42. All of the same issues discussed in the context of the single electoral districts
exist with respect to the at-large districts. However, since the single member districts
allow fifty per cent of the voters voting for a special service district councilman to live
outside the special service district, while only 40% of an at-large councilman's con-
stituents may live outside the special service district, the single member district poses the
more serious problem. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
43. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
44. 397 U.S. at 54.
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has been litigated in both state and federal courts. In Dortch v. Lugar,"'
the Indiana Supreme Court rejected all constitutional challenges to the
UNI-GOV Act. However, in Bryant v. Whitcomb" the District Court
for the Southern District of Indiana found that the UNI-GOV Act did
contain unconstitutional provisions relating to the composition and limited
authority of the special service district councils. In 1971 the General
Assembly amended the UNI-GOV Act in an effort to cure the con-
stitutional defects noted in Bryant.4 7 It is doubtful whether the amended
provisions effectively cure the defects noted in Bryant.
In Bryant, the court construed the original UNI-GOV Act so as
to exclude the four at-large city-county councilmen from membership on
special service district councils. The court found that while the statute48
appeared to allow the four at-large councilmen to be members of the
special service district councils,"' such a construction "would raise serious
constitutional issues since approximately forty per cent of the voters for
such councilmen would reside butside the special service districts."5
Therefore, construing the statute to exclude the four at-large city-county
councilmen was necessary to avoid placing "a construction on a statute
that would impute to a legislative body an intent to enact legislation
contravening constitutional principles."'" The court also warned that
provision would have to be made to limit the eligibility of members of
the city-county council elected from single electoral districts, since "even
a small enlargement of a special service district might have the effect of
placing the entire city-county council on the special service district
council." 2 The court's recommendation for such a provision was also
45. -Ind.-, 266 N.E2d 25 (1971).
46. Civil No. IP 69-C-115 (S.D. Ind., Feb. 3, 1970).
47. Pub. L. No. 258, §§ 1(m), 6, [1971] Ind. Acts 991, 996, formerly IND. CODE§§ 18-4-1-2(m), 184-4-5 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-9102(m), 48-9225 (Supp.
1970). The foregoing discussion of the constitutional questions raised by the method
of determining membership on special service district councils is based on the current
provisions of the Act, as amended.
48. A "special service district council" shall be comprised of the members
of the city-county council elected from all those districts which encompass
any part of a special service district.
IND. CODE § 1841-2(m) (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9102(m) (Supp. 1970), as
amended Pub. L. No. 258, § 1(m), [1971] Ind. Acts 991.
49. The electoral district from which the at-large councilmen are elected en-
compasses the entire special service district The statute only required that the
electoral district contain a part of the special service district in order for a city-
county councilman to qualify as a special service district councilman.
50. Slipsheet at 10.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 11. The special service district theoretically could have been expanded
so that each of the twenty-five single electoral districts would encompass at least
a part of the special service district. In that situation, all the members of the city-county
council would have become members of the special service district council, since the
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prompted by the fact that non-residents of the special service district
were able to vote for members of the district council. Noting that all the
constitutional defects" could be cured by proper implementation of the
existing statutes or by other means,"' the court did not enter a final
judgment but retained jurisdiction of the case until the defects noted
were resolved.
It is difficult to understand how the amended provision of the UNI-
GOV Act concerning the composition of the special service district
councils cures the defect noted in Bryant. The district court was concerned
with the constitutionality of a scheme whereby approximately forty
per cent of the voters for a special service district councilman might live
outside the district. Nevertheless, the amended provision specifically
authorizes membership on special service district councils by representa-
tives of an at-large district in which forty per cent of the voters reside
outside the special service district. Furthermore, membership is also
authorized for representatives of single electoral districts in which at
least fifty percent of the population resides outside the special service
district.
The only plausible explanation for such apparent disregard of the
districts from which they were elected would encompass "any part" of the special
service district.
53. The court also held that the statutory limitation on the authority of the special
service district council was unconstitutional as a substantial dilution of the voting
rights of those citizens who resided in the special service district. The original Act
provided that the sole function of the special service district council was "to approve
its budget and make [specified] appropriations and tax leviesJ" IND. CODE §
18-4-4-5 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9225 (Supp. 1970), as amended Pub. L. No.
258, § 6, [1971] Ind. Acts 996. The court reasoned that a combination of the city-
county council consisting of the nine or ten members elected from the districts
outside the special service district, the four at-large members and only one or two of
the members elected from districts entirely within the special service district could
overrule the vote of the city-county councilmen actually representing the citizens
of the special service district on such vital functions as police, fire, redevelopment and
housing, for these were functions left to the city-county council.
The amended statute would appear to cure this defect. It gives the special
service district council power to reject any ordinance adopted by the city-county
council which relates solely or exclusively to the special service district, if the Constitu-
tion of the United States or of the State of Indiana so requires. However, implementa-
tion of the amended provision raises such questions as: (1) Who determines when
the United States Constitution or the Indiana Constitution requires the approval of
the ordinance before it can become effective? (2) When is the determination to be
made? Unlike the provision concerning the composition of the special service district
council, which can be attacked on its face, the provision concerning the authority
of the council will require implementation before any constitutional issues can be raised.
54. After a careful analysis of the Act and the federal constitutional questions
presented, the Court finds that the Act does contain unconstitutional provisions.
However, each of the defects noted can be cured by implementation or other
means as pointed out later in this opinion.
Slipsheet at 2.
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district court's warning may lie in possible reliance by the General
Assembly on the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Dortch. The
Dortch decision held that the statutory provisions whereby the mayor
and at-large city councilmen are elected by all the voters of the county,
including those living in the "excluded cities,"5 did not cause a sub-
stantial dilution of the vote of the citizens of the consolidated city. Relying
upon the Avery rationale, the court found that the citizens of the "exclud-
ed cities" were entitled to vote for the officers of the consolidated city be-
cause a substantial number of the decisions and actions of those officials
affected them, though perhaps to a lesser extent than they affected actual
residents of the consolidated city.5" The court also based its decision upon
the fact tlat residents of the "excluded cities" presently were or could be
brought within the jurisdiction of the consolidated city for certain
matters. Since Dortch was decided nearly a year after Bryant and immed-
iately before the adoption of the 1971 amendments,17 it is possible that
the legislators believed that the Dortch rationale overcame the warnings
of Bryant.
However, there are several reasons why the rationale of Dortch
should not be applied to the special service districts. While some of the
decisions and actions of the consolidated city's officials may affect resi-
dents of the "excluded cities," the decisions and actions of a special service
district council can only affect residents of that district. This point may
be illustrated by focusing on the police special service district, although
the same arguments could be made concerning the other districts. Persons
living outside the police special service district are not within the
jurisdiction of that district for any matter. The statute specifically limits
the jurisdiction of the consolidated city police force to the territory of the
55. IND. CODE §§ 18-4-3-1, 18-4-3-6 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-9201, 48-9206
(Supp. 1970).
56. The court analyzed the provisions of the UNI-GOV Act relating to the
creation, organization and powers of the Department of Public Works in determining
that the citizens of the "excluded cities" are constituents of the consolidated city
insofar as they are affected by the decisions and actions of the officials of the con-
solidated city. The court found that several of the boards and departments within the
Department of Public Works had jurisdiction over the entire county. The County
Drainage Board, the Department of Flood Control and the Board of Flood Control
Commissioners were determined to have county-wide jurisdiction. Also, the Board of
Public Works has county-wide jurisdiction over air pollution matters. However, many
of the provisions of the UNI-GOV Act concerning the Department of Public Works,
such as the functions of the Board of Public Works of the First Class City and the
Board of Safety (with respect to the City Market) have no significance outside the
limits of the consolidated city.
57. Bryant was decided Feb. 3, 1970. Dortch was decided Jan. 26, 1971, and the
amendments were approved Apr. 16, 1971. The amendments became effective May 1,
1971.
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district and vests sole authority for that portion of the county outside the
police special service district in the sheriff's department."8 Therefore,
county residents living outside the police special service district receive
none of the benefits of the consolidated city police force. Furthermore,
persons living outside the police special service district bear none of the
burden of supporting police activities within the police special service dis-
trict. Taxes for the support of the consolidated city police force are levied
solely on property within the police special service district.59 Thus, the
reliance in Dortch upon the fact that residents of "excluded cities" are
affected by decisions and actions of the officials of the consolidated city is
not applicable to non-residents of special service districts.
Reliance upon possible future expansion of the police special service
district is similarly unwarranted. The fact that a citizen may at a later
date become subject to the jurisdiction of a special service district should
not entitle that individual to vote for officials who are presently making
decisions which affect only persons now residing within the district. In
the meantime, he is represented on the city-county council, the unit with
authority to extend the special service district boundaries so as to bring
him within its jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Within the terms of Sailors and Hadley, the special service district
council members are officials selected by popular election to perform
governmental functions. The districts from which they are elected must,
therefore, be drawn so that one special service district resident's vote is
given as much weight as that of any other. However, under the amended
provision of the UNI-GOV Act it is possible that the electoral districts
from which the special service district councilmen are chosen may vary
100 per cent from effective population equality. The United States
Supreme Court has never approved an apportionment plan allowing for
such a great population variance between equally represented districts.
Not only does the amended provision appear to violate the Supreme
Court's ruling concerning local governmental apportionment schemes,
but it also violates the warnings issued by the district court in Bryant
by specifically authorizing an apportionment scheme that can only serve
to "impute to a legislative body an intent to enact legislation contravening
constitutional principles."6
There are several possible solutions to the problem raised by the
58. IND. CODE § 18-4-12-7 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9407 (Supp. 1970).
59. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
60. Slipsheet at 10.
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statutory scheme for membership on the special service district councils..
Probably the simplest solution would be for the city-county council to
extend the boundaries of the special service districts to make them
coterminous with the boundaries of the consolidated city. The electoral
districts, which are currently satisfactory for the election of city-county
council members, would then be equally satisfactory for the election of
special service district council members. The actual effect of such a
procedure would be to abolish the special service district council, since the
statutes provide that the "service district may be abolished by the
director and such district shall become a department of the consolidated
city"'" when the boundaries of the special service district become cotermi-
nous with those of the consolidated city. Since the special service district
would be abolished, there would be no need for a council. This solution
would seem to be the most consistent with the overall purpose of the
UNI-GOV Act-the consolidation of city and county governmental
functions.
The statutory provision requiring that single electoral districts be
as equal in population and as compact in configuration as possible affords
another possible solution, since it provides that such districts should be
"subject . . . to the requirement, where practicable, of being located
entirely outside or entirely inside a special service district."82 If all the
single electoral districts were so drawn, there would be no variation
from effective population equality among the districts. The amended
provision of the UNI-GOV Act would then have on practical effect and
could be treated as surplusage as far as the single electoral districts were
concerned. However, this solution would not solve the problem of the
members elected from at-large districts. That portion of the statute
would still be open to attack for permitting forty per cent of the voters for
at-large councilmen to reside outside the special service district.
Other solutions would require extensive amending of the UNI-
GOV Act. For example, special elections could be held for members of
the special service district councils with voter eligibility based upon
districts drawn entirely within the special service districts. This would
prevent any overlap between the election of city-county council members
and special service district council members. The disadvantage of this
solution is that it requires two separate elections with different candidates.
The purpose of the consolidation was to eliminate as many of the
individual units of government as possible and to consolidate the functions
61. IND. CoDE §§ 18-4-12-6, 18-4-12-34 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-9406,
48-9441 (Supp. 1970).
62. IND. CODE § 18-4-3-8 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-9208 (Supp. 1970).
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of those former units. Therefore, such a separate election would be a step
backward from metropolitan reform. However, in light of the original
decision not to include the police and fire departments of the city and
county in the metropolitan scheme, to require implementation of the
logical result of that decision would not seem to be overly burdensome.
Membership on the special service district council could be deter-
mined by an appointive method. For example, the mayor could be given
the power to appoint the members. If desired, such appointment could be
restricted to city-county councilmen elected from districts in which a cer-
tain percentage of the population resides in the special service district.
This method would achieve the same result as the present statute, but
might possibly avoid the application of the one man one-vote principle
sinve the members of the special service district council would not be deter-
mined through a popular election. However, a court might look to the
substance of the scheme rather than to its form and find membership on
the special service district council to be indirectly determined by a popular
election.
Another possible solution would be the abolition of the special
service district councils, placing their former jurisdiction under the
city-county council. Under such an approach, the Indianapolis-Marion
County consolidation would more closely correspond to the previous
consolidations in Nashville-Davidson County and Jacksonville-Duval
County. The city-county council would then determine both the services
to be performed throughout the county and the additional services to be
performed only in the special service districts. The rationale of this system
is that the new city-county council would be simply a substitute for the
formerly separate city council and county council. Since each of these
former councils had the authority to determine the services to be per-
formed in its respective area, the city-county council should also have the
authority to determine what special services are needed only in the urban
area as opposed to those services needed in the entire county. Although
this system may raise some questions about the effective representation
of "inner-city" residents, it has been tested in the Tennessee Supreme
Court and found to be constitutional."
63. Frazer v. Carr, 210 Tenn. 565, 360 S.W.2d 449 (1962). One major distinction
which may be made between the Nashville-Davidson County consolidation and the
Indianapolis-Marion County consolidation is that in Nashville the proposed con-
solidation was approved by a referendum of all the citizens concerned. The Indianapolis-
Marion County consolidation is unique in that it was imposed by the state legislature
without a referendum. On this point, the Indiana Supreme Court, in Dortch, held
that the Indiana Constitution does not require that proposed legislative changes in the
form of local government be submitted to the citizens for a referendum vote. The court
stated:
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It is very doubtful that the provision of the amended UNI-GOV
Act concerning the composition of the special service district councils
can withstand a constitutional challenge. The provision appears to violate
both the Supreme Court's rulings in local govermental apportionment
cases and the warnings given by the district court in Bryant.
MICHAEL J. HUSTON
A requirement that any such proposed legislative change must be submitted
to the people for referendum has neither been recognized nor can it be implied
from the language of Art. 1, § 1.
- Ind. at -, 266 N.E.2d at 44-45. However, it seems likely that the absence of a
referendum may present a problem if the special service district councils are abolished
in the manner proposed.
